Tales of contentious selections and decisions that follow the direction of the state, at the expense of the university constituents’ interests, have long hounded the UP Board of Regents (BOR).
Emil Javier, embroiled in controversies about funds mismanagement in his chancellor stint and favored by then President Fidel Ramos, was selected as UP president by a Palace appointee-dominated BOR in 1993. And even when Malacañang bets do not win, such as with the triumph of UP President Emerlinda Roman over Arroyo-favored Edgardo Espiritu, the board’s policies still veered toward the administration’s interests. Roman was criticized for siding with Malacañang on issues such as the reappointment of government-selected regents and the privatization of UP lands.
Such instances of state intervention hamper the exercise of academic freedom. As a response, the BOR must reckon with its mandate to uphold democratic governance. Restructuring the board by reducing the number of regents from the government will ensure that their decisions will uphold UP’s academic freedom and institutional autonomy–the key parts in pursuing the university’s “search for truth and knowledge as well as the development of future leaders,” as the UP Charter declares.
The 1987 Constitution does not explicitly define academic freedom and only stated that it “shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.” Similarly, the UP Charter states that the university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom.
The notion that academic freedom must not only be cherished as a right but also an obligation concurs with the perspective championed by Judith Butler, a philosopher and professor at the University of California. “Academic freedom implies a right to free inquiry within the academic institution, but also an obligation to [preserve] the institution as a site where freedom of inquiry can and does take place, free of intervention, and censorship.”
Institutional autonomy is a precondition for the realization of academic freedom. Predicated on the erroneous premise that the state always reflects the people’s interests, some may argue that publicly funding UP necessitates government officials’ guidance in leading the institution to decide based on the citizens’ well-being.
However, materializing the transformative power of the university without wavering to the state and private interests is the greatest contribution that an institution could impart to the nation, wrote former UP President Franciso Nemenzo Jr. in his 1977 paper. Unrestrained by the state’s inclination to maintain the status quo, the autonomy of the university in formulating its policies will make sure that UP can forward proposals that can aid in the development of an informed public who can deliberate community concerns.
Consistent with the UP Charter’s promise of institutional autonomy of UP, no seats should be given to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) chairperson, three Malacañang appointees, and two other lawmakers on the board—an sum that already outnumbers the measly three representatives of the university’s sectors. Neither selected nor consulted by UP sectors, their membership is a perversion to the principles of representative and participatory governance.
State intervention weakens the university’s autonomous character. The vague provision that the palace may install three regents “who have distinguished themselves in their profession” grants too much power to the president. Even the CHED chairperson, as a member of the president’s cabinet, is essentially a Malacañang appointee. Regardless of their expertise or stances, their detachment from the university’s constituents renders these appointees incapable of reflecting the community’s decisions. The fact that they are also susceptible to answer to the official who appointed them already warrants the claim that their seats are unnecessary at best and perilous at worst.
Inessential, too, are the two lawmakers’ membership in the board accorded on the sole basis of their position in Congress. Even the grounds of legislative oversight are insufficient to justify their voting powers on the board. As legislators, part of their responsibility is to heed policy recommendations, including those from UP—a feat that can be undertaken without having to directly influence matters governing the university. Beyond budgetary concerns that could be settled through consultations, all other matters are already out of their spheres.
The removal of these six regents best captures the democratic governance characterized in the university’s charter. Though no seats could be occupied by them, government officials—much like everyone else in the public—can still lobby for proposals that may be heard and considered by the regents. Whether these recommendations will be granted is entirely at the discretion of the remaining representatives who are directly accountable to their constituents. This respects the university’s autonomy without abandoning public engagement through the UP president by virtue of their place as a high-ranking government official who also chairs the BOR.
Implementing this change must not pose further detriments to UP’s academic freedom that has already been assailed in the past years, which is why the restructuring of the BOR must merely amend the 12th section of the UP Charter and nothing more.
The confidence that this structure will set a democratic bearing rests on the assumption that the sectoral regents are truly representative of their respective sectors’ interests. Although the student, faculty, and staff regents already have systems in place for their selection processes, they must further ramp up their efforts to ensure their sectors’ voices are really heard inside the boardroom. Championing this grassroots approach will be possible through more exhaustive engagements with their respective sectors in selecting their regent, identifying their concerns, and collectively devising positions in both university and national concerns.
Seats from government officials must be minimized to maximize the voices of the university’s constituents. Only through the cessation of unwarranted state intervention can the BOR be truly committed to its responsibility to uphold academic freedom and represent the interests of the UP community. ●
Read the entire series here.
