By MARK VERNDICK CABADING & JUAN GREGORIO LINA

“History isn’t through with me yet,” said Ferdinand Marcos in the aftermath of the revolt that overthrew his regime. Marcos did not know, then, how prophetic his words would be as a new dictator in the person of President Rodrigo Duterte following his authoritarian politics, market-driven economic policies, bloodlust, and self-serving ambition.

The country may seem to have spiraled into under their administrations, but both Marcos and Duterte’s rhetoric and performance evince a pattern of calculated political moves to lay the ground for dictatorship. With the commemoration of the Martial Law declaration on September 21, the atrocities during this troubled period shall be remembered to assure the nation’s collective memory lives on–and that the people will not allow the triumph of another tyrant.

Taxing Problems

The last six years of Martial Law witnessed up to 300 percent increase in food prices, based on Martial Law Museum data. While Marcos era inflation rates are among the highest in history, the inflation rate registered recently under Duterte is nonetheless alarming.

The steepest prices increase hit basic commodities like rice and fish. Yet, Duterte’s economic managers attributed rising prices to global oil price hikes and peso depreciation, dismissing any blame on the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) Law. They insist that inflation would taper off by October, though TRAIN has, in effect, guaranteed the continuous permanent price hike by way of imposition of consumption taxes.

In its first installment, TRAIN led to the lifting of VAT exemptions and to higher excise taxes on sweetened beverages and petroleum products. Despite the public’s disapproval of TRAIN, the Tax Reform for Attracting Better and High-quality Opportunities (TRABAHO) bill, the second package of TRAIN, which decreases corporate income tax rates by 20 to 30 percent, has been passed by the Lower House. The regressive tax system has led to public outrage, which Duterte’s economic managers have maximized to advocate liberalizing schemes such as rice tariffication, which are upshots of earlier profit-seeking policies instituted beginning under Martial Law.

Indeed, at a time when other nations turn to protectionist measures, Duterte completes Marcos’s neoliberal agenda by paving way for more foreign investments, if not opportunities for the same powerful domestic oligarchs that have plunged the majority into chronic poverty.

Chartered Collapse

Now that Duterte holds power across all three branches of government, his master plan, federalism, has all the momentum to become reality. 

On the surface, the push to federalize aims to confer greater autonomy on regions to foster more localized development. This vision remains anchored on relaxing laws to entice foreign investors. Yet, a more sinister motive lies in Duterte’s drive for federalism: to solidify his hold onto the presidency and continue his authoritarian trajectory.

Federalism’s slated goals are but a perpetuation of the market-oriented policies characteristic of not only Marcos’ rule, but even of the presidents that succeed the dictator.

Should Duterte’s charter change see fruition, the grant of greater autonomy to various regions is feared to aggravate regional differences. Political dynasties, for instance, are predicted to become more potent in a federal state, thanks to the devolution to the local level of powers formerly reserved for the national government.

Moreover, the Philippines’ history of indulging foreign investment through the legislation of neoliberal policies has never turned out well for the country. Being profit-driven and competitive, transnational companies have never advocated domestic development. Their presence in the country as ensure by proposed federal charters will further disadvantage local industries and preclude long-term socioeconomic progress.

Despite touting federalism as the answer to social ills, charter change remains the linchpin of Duterte’s plans to consolidate his grasp on authority. Attempts to revise the constitution have been a constant theme in the nation’s history, all on the pretense of promising reform, but their underlying motives, like that of Duterte’s, remain to be self-interest.

Friend and Foes

Marcos exploited legal means to stay in power. His abolition of Congress, for one, gave him unparalleled authority. Duterte, in contrast, need not formally declare martial rule as his political machinations have allowed him to wield influence across all three branches of government.

Duterte’s base support in the Senate and the recent election of former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, a Duterte crony, as the speaker of the House of Representatives, where the president exerts supermajority, have allowed him to railroad—with little to no opposition—an agenda contrary to the populist narrayives he peddled during his presidential campaign.

The president has since reneged on vows to address issues such as social inequities and national sovereignty. Duterte, with the backing of the Congressional majority, has instead embarked on the same reactionary trail of his predecessors’, littered by inequitable tax reform, ill-advised infrastructure spending, and an emphasis on foreign independence, among others.

Progressives initially attracted to his assurance were ejected from key posts, as in the cases of former Social Welfare chief Judy Taguiwalo and former Agrarian reform secretary Rafael Mariano. Other members of the Left in the administration were persecuted outright, like National Anti-Poverty Commission chief Liza Maza and former representative Teddy Casiño, whose arrests were based on trumped-up charges dating from the Arroyo administration.

Other remaining pockets of resistance inside have been ostracized, like Sen. Antonio Trillanes, and before, the defunded 24 congressmen critical of Duterte.

The president’s grip on Congress would later allow him to control the judiciary. The ouster of former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, through the legally dubious quo warranto petition, and the subsequent appointment of Teresita Leonardo-de Castro known for her dislike of Sereno, has granted Duterte greater political clout to advance his agenda–the centerpiece of which is the shift to federalism.

Empire State Building

Marcos ushered in the construction of massive architectural projects like the Philippine International Convention Center and San Juanico bridge. Thirty years later, the Duterte administration will flaunt its “New Society” counterpart pet project, the “Build, Build, Build (BBB),” putatively “the key to bringing about the golden era of infrastructure in the country.”

Under both circumstances, infrastructural progress comes at a steep price.

In 1976, for example, the $32-million World Bank-funded Tondo Urban Renewal Project did not push through. Instead, considering the coinciding international conference in Manila, Imelda Marcos then ordered to displace 60,000 families from the slums of Tondo rather than complete the rehabilitation. Throughout their stay in power, the Marcoses amassed an estimated USD8 billion, according to Freedom from Debt Coalition.

Now, Duterte’s infrastructure projects under BBB are likewise fueled by foreign debts at the expense of the people’s income. Around P8.4 trillion worth of infrastructure like railways, roads, and airports will be erected under BBB until 2022. Twenty percent of the projects’ costs will be funded by TRAIN. On the other hand, at least 73 percent of the funding for BBB’s 75 flagship structural projects will come from ODA.

The confluence of debts disguised as foreign aid and the inutility of previous structural undertakings explains how the Philippine economy has spiraled down in the past. In the case of Marcos, the idled Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) cost USD 2.2 billion to build but has so far contributed nothing to electricity generation. Duterte’s big-ticket infrastructure projects might meet the same fate as BNPP.

The DOF, in fact, forewarns an increase in external debts for the next few years due to the implementation of BBB.

Additionally, Marcos’s New Society monuments not only served to legitimize the ballooning external debts to institutions like the World Bank, but also became sites of gross overspending. The risk of corruption recurring via Duterte’s BBB is high given how easy the funds for these projects can be funneled through bureaucracy of implementing government offices, like what went down under Martial Law, what with contracts handled by Marcos’ cronies.

Labor Pains

The numerous workers’ strikes enacted of late reveal the severity of working conditions under Duterte. The same picture of discontent depicted the workers’ situation under Marcos.

This period, after all, witnessed a significant increase in underemployment and unemployment rates, with the former tripling from 10.2 percent to 29.0 percent between 1978 and 1983. Whereas the underemployed pertains to workers whose training makes them overqualified for their current jobs, the unemployed refers to those who are unable to find any work at all.

For a developing country like the Philippines, the underemployment rate is a more significant indicator of the job situation than the unemployment rate. Back during Martial Law, many college graduates were unemployed while poor, skilled laborers were underemployed, conscripted into the informal job sector, which met the demands for additional workforce for the government’s infrastructure and construction projects.

During Martial Law, the rise of the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) phenomenon also intensified, a manifestation of the dissatisfaction among Filipino workers. Even now the economy relies on OFW remittances.

The Philippines under Duterte also suffered job losses of 2.2 million from July 2016 to July 2018. Although the labor force lately registered a 62.2 percent participation rate, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority, this does not translate to satisfaction with precarious labor conditions at present. These statistics only account for the segment of the population that belongs to the job sector, but not the millions who have dropped out of the labor force due to lack of employment opportunities.

Owing to the disparity between job generation and the growing unemployed sector, the workers continue to decry contractualization schemes. This gap encourages employers to implement cheap wage practices as workers are left with no other employment options.

The recent multiple workers’ mass actions such as in NutriAsia carry their calls for decent wages and better compensation, among others, under a faltering economy. According to the IBON Foundation, the minimum wage increases since 2012 have not been enough to offset effects of inflation, and with TRAIN 2 just rolled out, the worker will suffer more from inflation hikes in the months to come.

License to Kill

Fabricated rumors of an ouster plot against Marcos became the justification for the takeover of martial rule. Civil liberties and habeas corpus were suspended as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine Constabulary (PC), then the name for the country’s police force, turned into harbingers of brutality and death.

Decades later, the election of Duterte on the back of a drug scourge has emerged to revitalize state-sponsored violence, en masse. His tactics reuse the familiar underlay of disdain for human rights and the rule of law, of violence unleashed with impunity.

The Philippine National Police’s (PNP) Oplan Tokhang is reminiscent of the warrantless arrests of Marcos’ Martial Law, with “hit lists” of targets baselessly thrown in. The killings are no less gruesome than before, a call back to the institutionalized violence against opposition of which the Marcos regime was progenitor.

Indeed, the state has subverted liberal democracy’s mechanisms of accountability. Although unlike the constitutionalist Marcos who utilized charter change to enable his unilateral command by decree, Duterte has adopted the subtler approach of eliminating first the government’s checks and balances to carry out his authoritarian agenda.

In contrast to his contempt for the law, the president has been anything but contemptuous to the police and the military, who could wantonly resort to extralegal methods by which fascism rears itself.

To keep state forces motivated, Duterte has promised increases in compensation, more than doubling the base salaries and hazard pay of both police and military personnel. Duterte has also inserted uniformed officers into prominent government positions, a tactic well used by Marcos to buy loyalty of top brass in the AFP and the Constabulary.

The press under the Marcos dictatorship was likewise subject to censorship. The few news outlets and wire agencies were permitted to continue operation after Martial Law did so under the Marcos cronies’ supervision. The Duterte regime, in comparison, has refrained from a consummate restriction of press freedom, but has nonetheless treated the media with the same disdain as it does due process.

Particularly, most of the nine journalists murdered under Duterte’s watch belong to the alternative press, rendering them most vulnerable to retribution from state forces.

Borrowed Troubles

There has been a notion that Marcos ushered in the golden age for the Philippine economy. The “successes” of this regime, however, relied chiefly on aggressive spending that led to the swelling of the country’s external debt.

During the late 70s, the country’s debt grew exponentially until bursting into a full-blown crisis by 1983, according to data from the Martial Law Museum. From USD8.1 billion in 1977, the country’s debt almost doubled in 1982 and reached USD24.2 billion in just five years. Debts incurred under Marcos will continue to plague Filipino taxpayers until 2025, according to the IBON Foundation.

While the country has yet to recover from these debts, Duterte retraces history by depending on yet more foreign borrowing through the Official Development Assistance (ODA) route with China.

Under ODA, China and the Philippines will collaborate in transportation and infrastructure projects. While 30 percent of the funding for such projects will be covered by the Inclusion TRAIN Law packages and through public-private partnerships, the remainder will come from ODA, per the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA).

Many critics warned Duterte of the implications of the Chinese debt trap. Recently, for example, due to the Sri Lankan government’s inability to pay debt, the country had to lease its China-funded port to the Asian superpower for the next 99 years.

There is a cause for concern as China has higher loan interests than most creditor countries. For instance, China’s is 200-1100 percent more expensive than Japan’s, another leading foreign creditor. The country’s incapacity to implement planned projects in 10 years will result in billions worth of interest to China that may lead to another full-blown crisis.

The situation at present is nothing far from Marcos’ debt problem. Due to higher government spending, the peso-dollar exchange rate increased during Marcos’s era–a phenomenon the economy just suffered this quarter. Despite the façade of progress under Duterte, the risk of falling into another debt era is just around the corner. ●

Published in print in the Collegian’s September 9, 2018 issue.