If it is true that history repeats itself, it happens not through any drive of destiny, but through the handiwork of those wealthy enough to play god and promise redemption in return. Three decades after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos Sr.’s regime, the Philippines is set back in time as the children of tyrants now stand as the government’s highest-ranking officials.
Correspondingly, the same breed of self-serving politicians thrives in the cyclical arrangement of Philippine politics. Collusion among elite families has become a learned practice as economic policies favored the hegemony of oligarchs, even before the Marcos Sr. dictatorship. As a result, the Economist ranked the country fourth in the world’s crony capitalism index for the deep entrenchment of patrimonial plunder.
The persistence of an economic system inherently open to cronyism made the post-EDSA political-economic landscape fertile ground for the dominance of traditional elites, culminating in the return of the Marcoses themselves.
Aggressive Consolidation
As the country was thrust from one colonial project to the next, the conditions for economic reconfiguration fostered the ascent of oligarchs in trade and agriculture. The oligarchs’ agricultural empires expanded toward other business sectors such as manufacturing and retail to suit the reforms warranted by shifting markets. While few got wealthy, many with nothing but their labor were driven to participate in a system that rendered them constantly disadvantaged.
Poverty and income inequality had then festered due to the feudal rule of landowning elites during the post-war years. Political scientist Benedict Anderson dubbed this period the heyday of Cacique democracy where former haciendero masters were given full access to the state’s financial instrumentalities. Dynasties diversified into several spheres following the promotion of “economic independence” with free reign to plunder state and private resources.
Populist rhetoric gained momentum in this palpable dominance of dynasties. Marcos Sr. blamed these dynastic families for the country’s backward development, and so he proposed technocratic reforms to replace them. Disproportionate growth visibly fattened these dynasties while the underprivileged wrestled to survive, thus drumming up support for Marcos who seemingly contested this injustice.
But by the 1970s, Marcos Sr. had ironically turned his administration into a family affair by dismantling the country’s traditional oligarchy and replacing it with his cronies. He was known as the Supreme Cacique who dislocated the old order and systematically rigged the state’s economic policies for the benefit of his favored few. Key industries and cabinet positions were allocated to close relatives and allies, which made it nearly impossible for outsiders to penetrate the market.
Crony capitalism then centralized patrimonial networks into the hands of the first family. Fervent loyalty was rewarded with government contracts and industrial projects which commissioned monopolies within the nation’s economic sectors. Behind ambitious infrastructure projects lay the debt-ridden reality of Marcosian economics and its counterproductive endeavors at state-led development.
A great deal of this concentration was attributed to the “Octopus Gang,” composed of the dictator and his wife’s closest associates such as Roberto Benedicto, Rodolfo Cuenca, Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco, Lucio Tan, and Ricardo Silverio. Assigned to manage cash-crop, manufacturing, financial services, and construction sectors, most of them continue to dominate their respective industries and have yet to be held accountable for the country’s dismal economy.
The damage brought by this concentration is particularly evident in the crisis of the early 1980s as cronies bled national industries dry such that the country's debt rose from USD360 million to USD28.3 billion. Marcos Sr.’s rule had deepened inequality with three out of five Filipinos deemed poor as the wealthy enjoyed unimaginable privileges. It fueled a façade of progress despite the atrocities and irreversible damage the Marcoses and their cronies inflicted on the Filipino people.
Dissonance
Post-EDSA administrations marked the return of caciques which stalled the prospects of the 1986 uprising. Far from a system overhaul, a pseudo-democracy run by elites had replaced Marcosian autocracy. The comeback of oligarchic figures further undermined progressive reforms while enhancing the strength of local elite groups.
The Marcos plunder has been notoriously difficult to recover. While the Presidential Commission on Good Government was established for this task immediately after the EDSA revolution, 36 years after, only a fraction of the loot has been retrieved. The ouster of Marcos Sr. did not altogether extinguish the risks of cronyism but “left behind a governance infrastructure that needed (and still needs) to recover from a deep culture of corruption and rent-seeking,” according to researchers from Ateneo de Manila University in their paper on cronyism and oligarchy in the country.
Domestic oligarchs and business magnates would opportunistically turn coats now and then to maximize state support, and political clans in the government would lobby for legislation benefiting themselves and their allies. The tenacity of these elites to amass fortune would shape the contours of policy in the years to come. In a country with prolific land and institutions that are strangled by local and foreign profiteers for personal gain, this means working with the state to lord over land and labor while paying lip service to democracy.
The presidency of Corazon Aquino, first aiming to root out remnants of the Marcos regime, eventually fell short of its promises. Its attempt at land reform was a loophole-laden program that benefitted landlords more than it did farmers. The Cojuangco clan, from which Aquino hailed, continues to maintain control over Hacienda Luisita by distributing “stocks” rather than actual lands to farmers.
Under Aquino’s administration, prominent families who were targeted by the dictatorship resurfaced, such as the Ayalas who backed her presidential campaign in 1986. The Ayala clan would also secure several public-private partnerships under Cory’s son’s regime from 2010 to 2016.
With Marcos cronies and allies evading punishment, Danding Cojuangco was able to return from exile just three years after the revolt. And in the 1992 elections, he ran for president under the Nationalist People’s Coalition, a party he founded himself. However, he lost to Fidel Ramos, one of the chief architects of Martial Law, who withdrew support for Marcos Sr. when the dictatorship was nearing its end.
The 1992 elections were like a reunion of sorts, for among the presidential candidates was Imelda Marcos, and in Ilocos Norte, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. was running for Congress. But while the matriarch lost, the son won a seat—marking the first step of the Marcoses’ return to the corridors of power.
Some of the Marcos cronies themselves were even able to return to top business positions in the administrations that followed. After financing Joseph Estrada’s rise to the presidency, Lucio Tan and Cojuangco became the central business allies of his administration. Estrada then helped Cojuangco regain control of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) by allowing him to retrieve the shares that were confiscated during the Marcos regime. In 2012, Cojuangco passed the management of SMC to his protégé Ramon Ang, who would then propel Duterte and Marcos Jr.’s candidacy into victories.
Duterte and Gloria Arroyo seemed to steer away from the traditional Marcos-era oligarchs, as they introduced relatively new tycoons in their cliques, with the former even threatening to destroy Ongpin, the Lopezes and Ayalas.
Arroyo paved the way for Enrique Razon by selectively delegating to him infrastructure projects—like the Subic Port Modernization program—using foreign loans and subsidiaries. Razon would go on to be Duterte’s ally, and salvage debt-ridden Dennis Uy—another friend of the former president—by investing in Uy’s casino and acquiring shares in his Malampaya gas project.
Meanwhile, known Duterte-backer Ramon Ang would rise to number eight on Forbes’ list after SMC experienced its highest share price under the former president’s term, and after clinching several public infrastructure projects, such as the New Manila International Airport in Bulacan.
Altogether, domineering conglomerates enjoy longevity due to their tactical alliances with the state. Visible support for state-led initiatives granted their empires notable influence towards expansion plans and big-ticket investments, equally benefiting their business and the ruling clique.
Rather than positions for service, public offices are run like family businesses as poverty continues to swell amid dynastic leadership. As a result, the fat dynasties in 2004 grew from 57 percent to a staggering 80 percent after the 2019 midterm elections. This includes Duterte and Marcos Jr.-backers Villars and Cayetanos, whose families each control two seats in the Senate.
Despite the collapse of a dictator and his cronies, political patronage and monopoly control have nevertheless persisted. Past and present cronies continue to dictate the power struggles over the country’s economic sectors with little recourse for the public’s concerns. Their surnames may vary, but their ends have stayed the same: to control industries and preserve the privileges that come with crony capitalism.
Democracy For Whom
What awaits the country is difficult to be gleaned from the present administration’s vague economic agenda. However, it is likely for Marcos-style cronyism to intensify in the coming six years along with its immediate economic repercussions. And without a doubt, Marcos Jr. will exert efforts to protect their ill-gotten wealth, hinder justice for past transgressions, and shrink the arena for critical voices.
The Marcoses were indeed successful in their quest for “unity,” having manipulated the solidarity between fragmented parties and dynasties who altogether benefit from societal stasis. Their family’s revival has also set the stage for profit-oriented business tycoons like Ang and Razon who lingered comfortably amid the transition of power from Duterte to Marcos Jr.
It can be said that a new generation of cronies has emerged in recent years. The threads of politics and business heavily intertwine with each other due to the alliances formed by politicians who wish to advance their self-interests. Successful networks and influence pose deliberate impacts on the support garnered by their electoral campaigns which then translate to the stability of their candidacy.
Correspondingly, Marcos’s abstract promises in the campaign season were masterfully spun in his nebulous statements for economic transformation. Reminiscent of his father’s orations, his inaugural address merely glossed over the current fiscal deficit, and longstanding issues were oversimplified with ambitions for foreign investment. Marcos Jr. banks on private funding to finance his big plans for road infrastructure and transportation, similar to Duterte and Aquino III.
His camp’s enthusiasm for big-ticket development in continuation of Build, Build, Build reveals much about the true agenda of the so-called “unity” they wish to forward: cooperation amongst a circus of cronies. Most recent of these appointments include Manny Bonoan, SMC Tollways CEO, who is now the public works and highways secretary. Bonoan hails from the president’s home province, Ilocos Norte, and has benefitted from several positions in the Arroyo, Estrada, and Ramos administrations.
Once again, our country is left to face the gruesome economic impact of crony capitalism, despite the small strides it had taken after the EDSA uprising. However, the root of the problem lies not in these political networks, but rather, in addressing the inability of current institutions to contest these inherent pathologies.
Impartial interventions are impossible to attain when said institutions are composed of political appointees who willfully enable the cyclical democratic deficit. Hence, only by initiating the transformation of politics outside these institutions will we be able to weave the flow of our country’s history rather than fear its recurrence. ●
